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1. Introduction 
Adam Smiths’ invisible hand argument presented the concept that opening up a market will 
result in a globally efficient mechanism where consumers have the ability to choose freely 
what to buy, sellers or service providers are allowed to choose freely what and how to 
produce and sell, which in turn leads the market to settle on product and price distributions 
that are beneficial to all members of the community. Over the past decade, the Internet has 
facilitated the proliferation of new markets, called electronic Marketplaces (eMarkets) and 
corresponding opportunities for service providers and consumers alike. According to 
Feldman  adopting an eMarket approach to service provisioning helps to improve economic 
efficiency, reduce margins between price and cost, and speed up complicated business 
deals, where the services they provide will expand many companies purchasing and selling 
abilities and will make processes more dynamic and responsive to economic conditions, 
thereby helping to realise the goal of Adam Smiths’ invisible hand.  
To enable transactions within eMarkets, electronic Commerce (eCommerce) is employed, 
allowing entities to conduct their business over the Internet [He, 2003]. According to the 
nature of such transactions, the following types of eCommerce are distinguished: Business-
to-Business (B2B), Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C), Consumer-to-Business (C2B) and 
Business-to-Consumer (B2C). B2C refers to online retail transactions where the buyers are 
individual consumers and the sellers represent themselves as business cooperation’s, 
whereas B2B refers to the transactions where both buyers and sellers are business 
cooperation’s. With the rapid growth of the number of transactions conducted via electronic 
channels such as the Internet, there exists an ever increasing demand to develop advanced 
computational tools to streamline B2C and B2B eCommerce. Most of the initial Internet 
based eCommerce was focused on B2C markets. However B2B constitutes a much larger 
portion of the overall eCommerce landscape and it is widely believed that B2B will continue 
to grow and will be the predominant means of doing business in the near future [Shaw].  
Agents are seen as a key enabler for eCommerce where according to He (2003) “Electronic 
Commerce is the most important allocation for Agent technologies, because it is reality-
based and constitutes a massive market”. To support the integration of eMarkets and agents, 
Collins et al, designed a generalised multi-agent market architecture that can provide 
explicit and integrated support for complex agent interactions, such as that required in 
eMarkets. They defined three fundamental elements of the generalised multi-agent market 
architecture, including an exchange, the market and the market session.  O
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Within eCommerce and eMarkets, negotiations are ubiquitous and are considered an 
essential business activity for establishing trade relationships and fine-tuning terms and 
conditions in both B2C and B2B markets [Kim].  Given the ubiquity and importance of 
negotiations in various contexts, research into negotiation theories and techniques have 
attracted attention from multiple disciplines such as distributed AI [Kraus], social 
psychology [Pruitt], game theory [Nash, Rubinstein], operations research [Nash, Neumann], 
and more recently agent mediated electronic commerce.  
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the main concepts that relate to: Market design, 
auctions, automated negotiation, agents and eMarkets. The chapter will show how these 
related technologies work to enable the vision of Adam Smiths Invisible hand argument and 
how the Internet is paving the way towards a globally efficient mechanism for establishing 
trade agreements. 
2. Market design 
Ever since the conception of auctions in Roman times, their history has been traditionally 
fraught with misery. Auctions have been used in the sale of wives in Babylonia in 500 BC 
[Rawlinson], prisoners of war in ancient Rome, and African slaves in the 16th Century 
[Jenman]. Rules surviving from the auctions of these eras show that in some cases, at least, 
bids were called out sequentially with the bidder remaining at the end obtaining the object 
at the price she/he bid. A variant of this mechanism, in which a time limit is imposed on the 
bids, is reported by the English diarist and naval administrator Samuel Pepys (1633-1703). 
The auctioneer lit a short candle, and bids were valid only if made before the flame went 
out. Pepys reported that a flurry of bidding occurred at the last moment. At an auction on 
September 3, 1662, a bidder “cunninger than the rest” told him that just as the flame goes 
out, “the smoke descends”, signaling the moment at which one should bid [Pepys]. In fact 
the word auction is derived from the Latin augere, which means to increase. 
Early auctions mostly involved misery, trickery and low prices, used as a business of 
exploitation and sudden opportunity, and were rarely a serious part of traditional business. 
More recently however, auctions are used to sell artwork, United States Treasury bills, 
houses and corporations to name a few. The auction houses of Sotheby’s and Christie’s were 
founded in the mid 18th century, and one of the more recent Sotheby’s chairmen, A. Alfred 
Taubman, was once quoted stating “God help us if we ever take the theatre out of the auction 
business or anything else. It would be an awfully boring world.” A. Alfred Taubman, lived up to 
his own personal drama however, with the media frenzy surrounding his conviction in 
conspiring and colluding with his counterpart at Christie's auction house to fix the 
commissions paid by sellers of art, antiques and celebrity bric-a-brac [New York Times, 
2001].  
At the beginning of the twenty first century, auction houses, such as Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s are being eclipsed, at least in the value of the goods they sell, by online auction 
companies. For example eBay, founded in September 1995, sold US$3.27 billion in 2004. 
Sotheby’s and Christie’s, on the other hand together sell around US$1 billion of art and 
antiques each quarter. The mechanism used by eBay shares a feature with the one that 
Pepys observed: all bids must be received before some fixed time. The way in which the 
price is determined differs. In an eBay auction, a bidder submits a “proxy bid” that is not 
revealed, the prevailing price is a small increment above the second highest proxy bid. As in 
the 17th century auctions, Pepys observed, many bidders on eBay act in the last moment – a 
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practice known as “sniping” in the argot of cyberspace. Other online auction houses use 
different termination rules, for example, Amazon waits ten minutes after a bid before 
closing an auction. The fact that last minute bidding is less common in Amazon auctions 
than it is in eBay auctions has attracted the attention of game theorists, who have begun to 
explore models that explain it in terms of the difference in the auction’s termination rules. 
Despite the long history of auctions and other exchanges, market design had not gained 
momentum as a scientific discipline until recently. The momentum has emerged due to the 
large body of theoretical and empirical market literature that has been published in the field, 
particularly in the area of auction based protocols. A driving factor for this research has 
been the growth of eCommerce transactions over the Internet which has presented a large 
number of challenges in the design of eMarkets that support such eCommerce transactions. 
eMarket designers now need to deal with  geographically distributed traders who have 
multiple complex factors that they need to consider in their negotiations. In general a 
market designer’s task is to: create a meeting place for buyers and sellers; and a format for 
transactions that enforces a set of market rules that will lead to a “desired” outcome. This 
outcome of trade will be represented as the final allocation of traded objects and by the 
exchange of monetary payments between the participants. Market design is still in stages of 
infancy and comprises of tools and methodologies such as: equilibrium analysis; game 
theory; mechanism design theory; experimental economics; and computation. Within these 
methodologies, Game theory and mechanism design has provided some very valuable 
contributions to the field and as a result are further outlined below. 
2.1 Game theory 
Game theory is a set of analytical tools designed to help one understand the phenomena that 
we observe when decision makers interact. The basic assumptions that underlie the theory 
are that decision makers pursue well-defined exogenous objectives and take into account 
their knowledge and expectation or other decision makers’ behaviour. In other words, 
decision makers can be said, to be rational and they reason strategically. Gibbons and 
Osborne & Rubenstein provide useful introductions into the subject.  
Game theory assumes that there is a set of agents n = {i, i= 1, 2, …, n}. The action (strategy) 
space of agents is represented as iA , where iA  is the set of all available actions to player i , 
and an outcome ),...,( 1 naaa =  is thus simply an action profile. The most common and easiest 
game to solve problems in Game theory is known as a Bayesian game. In a Bayesian game, 
let agent i ’s possible payoff function be represented by );,...,( 1 ini taau , where it  is called 
player i ’s type and belongs to a set of possible types (or type space) iT . Each type it  
corresponds to a different payoff functions that player i  may have. Given this definition of a 
player’s type, saying that player i  knows his or her own payoff function is equivalent to 
saying that player i  knows her type. Likewise, saying that player i , may be uncertain about 
the payoff functions of the other players is equivalent to saying that player i  may be 
uncertain about the types of the other players, denoted by ),...,,,...,( 111 niii ttttt +−− = . We use 
iT−  to denote the set of all possible values of it− , and we use the probability distribution 
)|( iii ttp −  to denote player i ’s belief about the other players’ types, it− , given player i ’s 
knowledge of his own type, it .  
A key concept in game theory is a strategy which is a complete contingent plan, or decision 
rule, that defines the action an agent will select in every distinguishable state of the world. 
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For example, in an auction, the strategy of an agent would dictate what bid the agent should 
submit, given its type and the actions taken by the other agents. A pure strategy for player i  
in a Bayesian game is a function which maps player i ’s type into her strategy set, in that 
iii ATa →: , so that )( ii ta  is the strategy choice of type it  of player i . A mixed strategy for 
player i  is )(: iii AT Δ→α  so that )|( iii taα  is the probability assigned by iα  to action ia  by 
type it  of player i . Each agent will have a preference over outcomes and will try to choose a 
strategy so that its preferred outcome occurs. These preferences are expressed in terms of 
utility functions, where );,...,( 1 ini taau  is some real number and if agent i  prefers outcome  
);,...,();,..,( 11 iniini tbbutaau > , then we understand that player i  likes outcome ),...,( 1 naaa =  
strictly better than outcome ),...,( 1 nbbb = . The goal of each agent is to maximize it utility.  
Game theory is interested in finding equilibria. An equilibrium is a strategy profile which 
satisfies certain properties. The best known equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium. A 
Nash equilibrium of a game G  in strategic form is defined as any outcome ),...,( **1 naa  such that 
),(),...,( *** iiiii aauaa −− ≥  for all ii Aa ε  holds for each player i . The set of all Nash equilibria of G  
is denoted )(GN . In Bayesian Nash equilibrium every agent involved is assumed to share a 
common prior knowledge about the distribution of agent types, type )(tF , such that for any 
particular game the agent profiles are distributed according to )(tF . In equilibrium each 
player or agent selects a strategy to maximize its expected utility in equilibrium with 
expected-utility maximizing strategies of other players, in other words each player’s 
strategy must be a best response to the other player’s strategies. That is, a Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium is simply a Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian game. A stronger equilibrium 
concept in game theory is the dominant strategy equilibrium.  
In the dominant strategy equilibrium, the problem of forming a conjecture about the action 
choice of other players does not arise, because there is an optimal way of taking an action 
independently of the intended play of others. Games with dominant strategy equilibria are 
easy for agents to play since it is obvious what their optimal strategy is and they do not need 
to worry about what the other agents are doing. While many games do not have dominant 
strategy equilibria, in many practical implementations it is possible to carefully design 
games in order to guarantee that dominant strategies of the agents are such that agents are 
best off truthfully telling their true preferences to the auctioneer. 
2.2 Mechanism design 
In a mechanism design problem one can imagine that each agent holds one of the “inputs” 
to a well formulated completely specified optimization problem, perhaps a constraint or an 
objective function coefficient, and that the system wide goal is to solve the specific 
instantiation of the optimization problem specified by the inputs [Hurwicz].  
The system wide goal in mechanisms design is defined with a social choice function, which 
selects the optimal consequence, given an agent’s type, where a social choice function 
CTTf n →×× ...: 1 , chooses a consequence Ctf ε)( , given types ),...,( 1 ni ttt = . A Mechanism 
(.));,...,( 1 gSSM n=  defines the set of strategies iS  available to each agent, and an outcome 
rule CSSg n →×× ....: 1 , such that )(sg is the consequence implemented by the mechanism for 
strategy profile ),...,( 1 nsss = . Game theory is used to analyze the consequences or outcome of 
a mechanism. Given mechanism M  with outcome function (.)g , we say that the mechanism 
implements a social choice function )(tf , if the consequence computed with equilibrium 
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agent strategies is a solution to the social choice function for all possible agent preferences. 
The equilibrium concept can be either Nash, Bayesian-Nash, dominant – or some other 
solution concept, so long as the strongest one is used [Varian, Jackson]. 
The most important properties, according to Bichler, for designing a mechanism include 
equilibrium, efficiency, stability, incentive compatibility and speed of convergence. A 
mechanism is efficient, meaning that the allocation resulting from the auction is Pareto 
optimal, where no agent can improve its allocation without making another agent worse off. 
This means that the auction is efficient if there are no further gains from trade, and that the 
goods are allocated to the agents who value them most highly. The solution is said to be 
stable if there are no subset of agents who could have done better by coming to an agreement 
outside the mechanism. If a mechanism is stable then it is Pareto efficient, although the 
reverse is not true. A direct auction is incentive compatible if honest reporting of valuations is 
a Nash equilibrium. A particularly strong and strategically simple case is a mechanism 
where truth telling is a dominant strategy. This is a desirable feature because as an agent’s 
decision depends only on its local information, and it gains no advantage by expending 
effort to model other agents. Mechanisms that require agents to learn or estimate another’s 
private information do not respect privacy. Speed of convergence is another important issue 
in markets where transactions need to occur at a rapid rate. A good example is the Dutch 
flower auction. Since these auctions deal with large volumes of perishable goods, each 
individual transaction needs to be completed quickly.  
Mechanism design theory now forms an integral part of modern economics where it’s most 
successful use has been its application to auction theory. These two areas intersect in the 
area of optimal auction design, where principles from mechanism design are combined with 
auction theory to design auctions that achieve the desired optimal outcomes [Bichler]. 
3. Automated negotiation 
While market design helps decide the rules of the negotiation, and can also assist in the 
design of auctions to achieve optimal outcomes, a rationale for using auctions in eMarkets 
has yet to be discussed. It is the purpose of this section, where the reasons why automated 
negotiation techniques are important in eMarkets, how and why different auctions are 
appropriate for different situations, and the main auctions types and their optimal strategies 
as computed using Game theory are discussed. 
According to Bichler, within negotiation, “current human-based procedures are relatively 
slow, do not always uncover the best solution”, and are, furthermore, according to Beam 
and Segev (1997) constrained by issues of culture, ego and pride. In addition, human 
participants in the negotiation process often reach suboptimal agreements thereby “leaving 
money on the table”.   Human’s inability to find better agreements is due to the fact that 
negotiation is a search process for the optimum agreement. The main difficulty in this 
optimisation search process is that each party involved in the negotiation has private 
knowledge and each side does not normally know this private knowledge and their 
corresponding utility functions. Furthermore both sides often have an incentive to 
misrepresent their preferences, thereby making the formation of an optimal 
agreement/solution an extremely challenging task. Essentially, both sides are in competition 
but must jointly search for possible agreements.  
For the past few decades researchers in the field of economics, game theory and behavioural 
sciences have investigated this negotiation process. However despite the large amount of 
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research conducted a solid and comprehensive framework is still lacking. A basic principle 
of microeconomics and negotiation sciences is that there is not a single “best” protocol for all 
possible negotiation situations. Wurman et al, asserts that different negotiation protocols are 
appropriate in different situations, and, thus, any generic mediation service should support 
a range of options. To demonstrate this point  the abstract, in Table 1 below will analyse key 
countries (i.e. Britain, Switzerland and Denmark) and the chosen auction protocols used in 
the sale of the 3G spectrum licences, which cost European telecommunication operator’s 
approx $700 billion US Dollars [Klemperer]. 
 
The sale of the European 3G spectrum licences began in Britain in March 2000. Because 
Britain was the first country to sell such licence agreements it had what is called “first 
moreover advantage”. Britain originally planned to sell just four licenses but faced the 
problem that there was exactly four incumbent “2G” mobile phone operators who had 
advantages over the other bidders. In this situation if Britain decided to use an ascending 
auction protocol it would be susceptible to the problems of: collusion; and could deter the 
weaker bidder to enter the race since a weaker potential bidder knows that a stronger 
bidder can always re-bid to top any bid he makes. If Britain used a pure sealed bid 
auction this could allow a situation where a bidder with lower values could beat 
opponents with higher values leading to potentially an inefficient outcome compared to 
an ascending auction. As a result, Britain planned to use a hybrid of the ascending and 
sealed bid auctions, called “Anglo-Dutch” auction. In this configuration, the ascending 
auction continued until just five bidders remain, after which the five survivors made 
sealed bids. In this scenario the sealed bid stage would attract entry and so also raise 
revenue, while the ascending would mean less loss of efficiency that might result from a 
pure sealed-bid auction. In this auction nine new entrants’ bids strongly against the 
incumbents, creating intense competition and record-breaking revenues of 39 billion 
Euros.  
The Swiss auction experience presented the most embarrassing result, where it decided to 
use the ascending auction protocol. Although the auction received initially considerable 
interest from numerous bidders the type of auction protocol turned the weaker bidders 
off participating where the number of bidders reduced from nine to four. As a result the 
telecom operators just had to pay the reserve price for the spectrum licence agreements 
which were one thirtieth per capita of the UK and German prices, and one-fiftieth of what 
the government had once hoped for.  
Denmark ran the last of the auctions in September 2001 and was in a particularly tricky 
position. Valuations were now low and to further complicate matters Denmark planned 
to sell the same number of licenses as it had incumbent operators. As a result it choose a 
sealed bid auction to give weaker bidders a chance of winning, in the hope of attracting 
new entrants and of scaring the incumbent operators into making higher bids. The 
auction was a resounding success, attracting a serious bid from a new entrant and 
shocking analysts with a revenue more than double most expectations. 
What is visible from above is that one generic auction protocol does not fit all. The 
auction protocol selected must bear in mind a number of factors, such as the number of 
bidders, possibility of collusion, and market stability. The countries that borne these 
factors into their design produced an outcome that generated the most revenue for their 
corresponding governments while countries like the Netherlands that just copied other 
countries choice suffered the consequences.   
Table 1. Abstract - discussing how one size does not fit all when it comes to auction protocol 
design [Klemperer] 
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Recent developments in electronic market research offer the promise that new negotiation 
protocols will not only leave less money on the table but will also enable new types of 
transactions to be negotiated more cost effectively. There have been many approaches for 
supporting or automating commercial negotiations, such as bargaining and auctions. 
Bargaining situations can concern as few as two individuals, who may try to reach an 
agreement on a range of transactions. Over the past decade, there have been several 
approaches to supporting or describing one-on-one negotiations, ranging from game theory 
to negotiation support systems to intelligent agents who bargain the details and finally close 
the deal without any further user interactions. According to Bichler, however, although 
much research has been accomplished, automated bargaining using agents is currently 
restricted to a small number of applications in commercial environments. The reason for 
this, is that game theory has failed, thus far, to describe human bargaining, where Linhart et 
at state that “inadequate theories of bargaining exist only for the degenerate, polar cases of 
competition and monopoly”. In addition negotiation support systems require constant human 
input, both at the initial problem setup and all final decisions are left to the human 
negotiators, making automated bargaining not so automated.   
McAfee [McAfee] defined an auction as “a market institution with an explicit set of rules 
determining resource allocation and prices based on bids from the market participants”. 
Auctions constitute one type of dynamic pricing, in which the price of the product varies, 
depending on the demand characteristics of the consumer and the supply situation of the 
seller and are often used rather than posting a fixed price on an item, in cases where 
products have no standard value. In addition to price determination, according to Kagel 
(1997), auction theory is also important for practical, empirical and theoretical reasons. The 
roots of electronic auction and negotiation mechanisms are in auction and negotiation 
theory. See for instance, Raiffa, Milgrom, Kagel and Roth (1995), Klemperer, and Rothkopft 
et al.  
Using auctions as a means of automating negotiation in eMarkets has been described by 
Binmore and Vulkan (1999) as “an effective way of resolving the one to many bargaining 
problem”. According to experiments described in Kagel et al (1995) the outcome of market 
competition is more likely to conform to game-theoretical rationality than the outcome of a 
bilateral negotiation. In addition compared to the bargaining process, being a bid taker puts 
less of a burden on the seller’s knowledge and abilities than being a negotiator in a 
bargaining process, simply because the human or agent does not need to know the range of 
possible buyer valuations. In general the price set by the eMarket i.e. the winning bid is on 
average below the item’s true but unknown value, but with the introduction of more and 
more bidders, the price approaches its true value.  
In addition, to further advocate the use of auctions in automated negotiation procedures, the 
technical infrastructure required to support auctions in an online environment is currently 
available and well accepted. Wurman (2001) outlined how auctions are a very efficient and 
effective method of allocating goods/service, in dynamic situations to the entities that value 
them most highly, whereas Bapna et al stated that “Online auctions, bought about by the 
synergetic combination of Internet technology and traditional auction mechanisms present a 
significant new dimension for mercantile processes”. Intelligent software agents can also 
represented their owners in an auction, where the agent activities may involve monitoring, 
analyzing the market conditions and/or deciding when and how much to bid for the 
desired items.  
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There are many different forms of auctions, where [Wurman, 1998] defines a taxonomy of 
auction parameters that allows for approximately 25 million types of auctions. Beam and 
Segev (1997) also examined 100 online auctions and analyzed their characteristics. However 
despite this vast range of auction protocols there are only four common types of single sided 
auctions, which include: English, Dutch, First Price Sealed Bid (FPSB), and Second Price 
Sealed Bid (SPSB) which are outlined below. Included in the description of each of these 
auction types is the strategy that the human or agent needs to employ to receive the highest 
utility in the process.  Within these auction types the Dutch auction and First-Price Sealed-
Bid are strategically equivalent to each other, while the English auction protocol and the 
Second-Price Sealed-Bid auction are strategically equivalent to each other. To see how these 
strategies were computed in more detail, please see [Gibbons].  
However, the strategies shown in Table 2 only hold true under the auction model more 
commonly known as the symmetric Independent Private Value (IPV) model and perceived 
valuations in the common-value-model. Under the IPV model, Bidder i  knows his own 
valuation, iv , where this valuation is the true valuation in the independent-private-values 
models. Each bidder is assumed to know the number of bidders, their risk attitudes, and the 
probability distributions of valuations, and he knows everyone else knows that he knows 
this, and so on. At a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, each bidder bids an amount that is some 
function of his own valuation, such that, given that everyone else chooses his bid in this 
way, no individual bidder could be better by bidding differently [McAfee].  
At the other model extreme, consider the sale of an antique that is being bid for all dealers 
who intend to resell it, or the sale of mineral rights to a particular tract of land. Now the 
item being bid for has a single objective value, namely the about the antique is worth on the 
market, or the amount of oil actually lying beneath the ground. However no-one of course 
knows its true value and so the bidders, perhaps having access to different information, 
have different guesses about how much the item is objectively worth. If V  is the unobserved 
true value, then the bidders’ perceived values, iv , ,,....,2,1 ni = are independent draws from 
some probability distribution )|( VvH i . All agents know the distribution H . This is called the 
common-value model. A frequently observed phenomenon under this auction model is the so 
called winner’s curse phenomena. In this situation the winner bids more that the goods true 
value and suffers a loss. The main lesson learned from the common value model is that 
bidders should shade their bids, as the auction always selects the bidder as the winner who 
received the most optimistic estimate of the items value [McAfee].  
Another important point to note that under these conditions the revenue equivalence 
theorem holds, which essentially states that in any auction that has [Klemperer] “a given 
number of risk neutral potential buyers of an object has a privately known signal independently 
drawn from a common, strictly increasing, atomless distribution. Then any auction mechanism in 
which (i) the object always goes to the buyer with the highest signal, and (ii) any bidder with the 
lowest-feasible signals expects zero surplus, yields the same expected revenue (and results in each 
bidder making the same expected payment as a function of their signal)”. What the above states is 
that when the object goes to the buyer with the highest valuation, then the outcome of the 
auction is said to be Pareto efficient. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem also proves that for 
in [Vickrey] “each of the English auction, the Dutch auction, the first-price sealed bid auction, and 
the second price-sealed bid auction yields the same price on average”. Therefore all four types of 
auctions yield the same expected revenue for the seller in the case of independent private 
values and risk neutrality. 
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Auction 
Protocol 
Description Strategy 
Ascending Bid 
or English 
auction 
The price is successively raised until at 
least one bidder remains. This can be 
done by having an auctioneer announce 
prices, or by having bids submitted 
electronically with the current best bid 
posted. The essential feature of the 
English auction is that, at any point in 
time, each bidder knows the current best 
bid. Antiques, art work and houses are 
sometimes sold using this type of 
auction. 
The agent’s dominant strategy (the best 
thing to do, irrespective of what the others 
do []) is to bid a small amount more than 
the current highest bid and stop when the 
user’s valuation is reached. For example, 
in Yahoo auctions, “autonomic bidding” 
allows users to input their maximum bid 
and an agent will bid incrementally when 
it is necessary to win the auction. 
Descending Bid 
or Dutch 
auction 
The agent’s dominant strategy (the best 
thing to do, irrespective of what the 
others do [Gibbons]) is to bid a small 
amount more than the current highest 
bid and stop when the user’s valuation is 
reached. For example, in Yahoo auctions, 
“autonomic bidding” allows users to input 
their maximum bid and an agent will bid 
incrementally when it is necessary to win 
the auction. 
Strategically equivalent to First-Price 
Sealed –Bid 
First-Price, 
Sealed-Bid 
(FPSB) auction 
Each bidder independently submits a 
single bid, without knowledge of what 
bids is submitted by other participants. 
The object is sold to the bidder who 
makes the highest bid. This type of 
auction is used in auctioning mineral 
rights in government-owned land, and is 
sometimes used is the sales of artwork 
and real estate. Of greater quantitative 
significance is the use of sealed bid 
tendering for government procurement 
contracts - that is competing contractors 
submit prices and the lowest bidder wins 
and receives her price for fulfilling the 
contract.  
The dominant strategy in First-Price 
Sealed -Bid of complete information is to 
bid the second highest bidders valuation, 
while in First-Price Sealed-Bid of 
incomplete information the dominant 
strategy, computed using game theory is 
that he bids a fraction ((n-1)/n)v of his 
valuation v, when a total of n parties are 
bidding. Further analysis of this strategy 
is provided in [Gibbons]. 
The Vickrey or 
Second-Price, 
Sealed-Bid 
auction 
Operates in the same manner as FPSB 
and while the object is still sold to the 
bidder who makes the highest bid, the 
winning bidder pays the second-highest 
bidders bid, or “second price”. While this 
auction has useful theoretical properties, 
it is seldom used in practice due to its 
vulnerability to a lying auctioneer, lower 
revenue when compared to the English 
auction and undesirable private 
information problems [Gibbons]. 
The (weakly) dominant strategy used in 
Vickrey auctions is to bid the valuation iv  
for player i . Strategically equivalent to 
the English auction protocol. 
 
Table 2. Main auction types and corresponding strategies 
3.1 Terms and extensions to the main auction protocols 
In many real world situations, competition and negotiation involve many quality 
dimensions in addition to price. In Rothkopf and Harstad’s critical essay, the authors 
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outlined how it would be useful to expand their limited focus, because isolated, single good 
auctions are not the most common or interesting auction type from a practical perspective. 
As a result there have been several extensions to the traditional auction paradigm in recent 
years, which are further discussed below. 
One active field of study has been multiple unit and multi-object auctions. At multi-unit 
auctions, the objects for sale are assumed identical, so it matters not which unit a bidder 
wins but rather the aggregate number of units he wins. At multi-object auctions, the objects 
for sale are not identical, so it matters to a bidder which specific objects he wins. Thus an 
example of a multi-object auction would involve the sale of an apple, orange, and a pear, 
while an example of a multi-unit auction would involve the sale of three identical apples. In 
the auction’s simplest case, the bidders are allowed to buy only one unit of merchandise. In 
the more realistic case, such restrictions cannot be imposed. The consequence of the 
additional quantity dimensions is that traditional bidding strategies and auction design 
mechanisms should be reconsidered and adjusted. As Bapna et al, and Rothkopf and 
Harstad, among others have pointed out, the strong theoretical results obtained for isolated 
single good auctions, are not necessarily transferable to the more complicated multiple unit 
situation.  
Another extension is the development of combinatorial auctions, in which bidders desire to 
buy or sell bundles of goods rather than one single good. For example, a seller may want to 
sell several kinds of related goods where many bidders may have preferences over a 
combination of items. After the seller receives all the bids, it will decide a non-conflicting 
allocation among these goods that maximizes its revenue. These sorts of auctions are 
involved in many situations in the real world especially the computational issues associated 
with winner determination and final allocation [Kelly]. For example in the sale of the 
Germans spectrum licences,  bidders placed bids on different combinations of spectrum 
licenses.  However, combinatorial auctions are currently rare in practice. The main problems 
confronted in implementing these auctions are that they have computational uncertainty, in 
that there is no guarantee that the winning bids for such an auction can be found in a 
reasonable amount of time when the number of bidders become larger, and that the auction is 
cognitively complex and can lead participants to pursue perverse bidding strategies [Kelly].   
Double-sided auction is a further auction type extension. The most common type of this 
auction type is the Continuous Double Auction (CDA), which allows buyers and sellers to 
continuously update their bids at any time in the trading period. This type of auction is easy 
to operate, efficient and can quickly respond to changing market conditions. A variety of 
CDA models have being constructed [Easley] and these vary in terms of whether bids/asks 
are for multiple or single units, whether unaccepted offers are queued or replaced by better 
offers and so on. Nevertheless all these protocols allow traders to make offers to buy or sell 
and to accept other trader’s offers at any moment during a trading period. The messages 
exchanged generally consist of bids (offer to buy) and asks (offers to sell) for single units of 
the commodity, and acceptances of the current best bid or ask. Several bidding strategies 
have been proposed in the literature. The ZERO Intelligence strategy [Gode], generates a 
random bid within the allowed price range decided by the agent’s budget constraint. The 
adaptive agent bidding strategy is based on stochastic modelling of the auction process 
using a Markov chain [Park]. A sequential bidding agent method using dynamic 
programming is proposed in [Tesauro]. In [He , 2003], heuristic fuzzy rules and fuzzy 
reasoning mechanisms are used to determine the best bid given the state of the marketplace. 
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Another extension to the traditional auction paradigm is multidimensional auctions, also 
referred to as multi-attribute auctions. Multi-attribute (reverse) auctions combine the 
advantages of auctions, such as high efficiency and speed of convergence, and permit 
negotiation on multiple attributes with multiple suppliers in a procurement situation. A 
multi-attribute auction is defined “as an item characterized by several negotiable dimensions” and 
first arose in the tenders and procurement area [Dasgupta]. The advances in information 
technology also allow the use of varied and more complex auction mechanism, where 
Fieldman [cf. Bichler] stated that ''We've suddenly made the interaction cost so cheap, there's no 
pragmatic reason not to have competitive bidding on everything''. If the multidimensional auction 
has the variable quantity, it is referred to as multiple issue auctions. Laffont and Tirole, 
describes many of the critical issues in procurement negotiations from an economics point of 
view and also mention the need for a generalization of auction theory to so called “multi-
dimensional bidding”. Perhaps since multidimensional/multiple issue auctions hold great 
promise for the improvement of B2B transactions, their development has largely been 
practice driven. Generalizations of standard auction theory to the multi-attribute case has 
been discussed by Thiel, Che, Branco and more recently David et al, and De Smet. 
An important distinction to make with regards to auctions is that there exist forward or 
reverse auctions. In the forward auction the seller offers a product to numerous buyers, 
where the seller “controls” the market because a product is being offered that is in demand 
by a number of buyers. The price offered by the buyer continues to increase until a 
theoretical rational market price is met in the market. Supply and demand sets the price. In a 
reverse auction, the buyer “controls” the market because the item being offered is available 
from a number of sellers. The price offered by the sellers continues to decrease until a 
theoretical rational market price is achieved. The basic premise of a reverse auction is that a 
sufficient supply exists and seller’s profit margins are sufficient to offer reduced prices. The 
reduced price will be offered because the suppliers can instantaneously observe the prices 
being offered by other sellers [Smeltzer, Carter]. 
4. Electronic marketplaces (eMarkets) 
The previous sections described how optimal markets are designed using techniques such 
as Game theory and Mechanism design. They outlined how automated negotiation 
techniques aim to overcome the problem of “leaving money on the table” in the negotiation 
process and how auctions have been proposed (with the use of intelligent software agents) 
to overcome this problem. This section will describe the main elements that constitute real 
world eMarkets and a classification scheme to help distinguish and provide a comparison of 
eMarkets currently in existence. 
A multi-agent eMarket is highly complex, possessing a large number of attributes connected 
to its architecture such as security, tools for communication between agents, and 
distribution of roles played by agents and the marketplace. According to He et al, it is 
important to classify eMarkets according to some attribute, where He et al, defines the most 
important classification attribute to be the negotiation attribute. In negotiations the topology 
can be classified according to: 
Nature of interactions between agents – which is important for an eMarket to distinguish 
whether participants are allowed to negotiate on a multilateral basis i.e. with several other 
participants or not. On either side – on the buyer or sellers side – one or more participants 
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may be negotiating. Denoting the seller as M (“Merchant”) and the buyer as C 
(“Consumer”), Figure 1 shows the three possible situations given by models A, B and C. 
Number of negotiating factors – is an important characteristic in every negotiation as it 
represents the dimension of the space of negotiation issues. In more complicated “real” 
cases, a number of issues relating to price, quality, penalties, terms and conditions may be 
discussed i.e. multidimensional. 
Whether the negotiation constraints are fuzzy or crisp – the preferences regarding the 
negotiation issues may also be represented as either crisp or fuzzy, which makes it possible 
to evaluate a proposal and generate a counter proposal based on a certain strategy. If the 
issues are crisp then the preferences for these issues cannot be changed to generate a 
proposal or counter proposal, where if the issues are fuzzy then the various entities can 
truly negotiate by proposing values outside of their preferences. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Three models of competitive negotiation in eMarketplaces 
Using the above attributes, Kurbel developed a classification scheme presented by using a 
technique of morphologic boxes, as shown in Table 3, where the field ‘Type of Negotiation’ 
corresponds to nature of interactions between entities i.e. A, B or C denoted in Figure 1. In 
addition to the classification technique presented by He et al, Guttmann et al, outlined how 
it is useful to explore the roles of agents as mediators in B2C and B2B eCommerce in the 
context of a common model, such as the Customer Buying Model (CBB) and the Business 
Buyer Model (BBT). However this classification scheme is not presented within the scope of 
this chapter, for further information please see the associated literature. Based on the used 
and presented classification scheme a survey of well known eMarkets is presented in the 
section below. 
 
Criterion Possible Values 
Type of e-marketplace B2B B2C C2C 
Type of negotiation model 1:n (A) m:1 (B) N:m (C) 
Negotiation Issues One issue (price) Many Issues 
Type of consumers constraints Crisp Fuzzy 
Type of merchants constraints  Crisp Fuzzy 
Table 3. Classification of controlled multi-agent e-marketplaces 
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4.1 Survey of electronic marketplaces (eMarkets) 
Andersons Consulting’s BargainFinder [Krulwich] was the first shopping agent for on-line 
price comparisons. Given a specific product, the BargainFinder agent requests its price from 
nine different merchant Web sites using the same request from a Web browser. The retailers 
play passive roles in this process, they just provide information to the buying agents. 
Although a limited proof of concept, BargainFinder offered valuable insights into the issues 
involved in price comparisons in the on-line world. However, value added services that 
merchants offer in their Web sites are bypassed by BargainFinder as it compares merchants 
based on price alone. Strictly speaking, eMarkets like BargainFinder are not multi-agent 
eMarkets because the merchants are statically represented through information about their 
products and not through software agents. Neither are the consumer’s agents sufficiently 
intelligent as they possess some autonomy and very little features for cooperation. 
Nevertheless, some of these online shopping markets can be regarded as important steps on 
the way to multi-agent eMarkets.  
Another similar example to BargainFinder is Priceline1 which carries out the same set of 
tasks for airline tickets, hotel rooms and cars. However a more important contribution 
within this domain is Jango [Doorenbos], which can be viewed as an advanced 
BargainFinder providing a more intelligent solution by having the product requests 
originate from each of the consumers Web browsers instead of from a central site as in 
BargainFinder. Jango’s modus operandi is simple: once a shopper has identified a specific 
product, Jango can simultaneously query merchant sites for its price. The results allow a 
consumer to compare merchant offerings based on price.  However in many cases price is 
not the only important factor to the user. Other relevant issues, for example, might include 
delivery time, warranty and gift services. Also many merchants prefer their offering not be 
judged on price alone. Naturally the importance of different attributes will vary between 
consumers and so there needs to be a way for this information to be easily conveyed to the 
agent. 
This limitation was overcome in the Frictionless2 scoring platform, “vendor scorecards” a form 
of multi-attribute auction that was used to measure the performance of suppliers. For 
example, when evaluating the performance of different laptop computer suppliers, the key 
factors considered include reliability, responsiveness, environmental friendliness and 
business efficiency. A total score is then calculated for each supplier based on the weighted 
score of these individual constituent components. Although quick and easy to use, the 
Frictionless engine neglects one essential aspect of decision making in a vague environment 
with fuzzy constraints and preferences. A consumer has no means to enter into the system 
how important the different negotiation issues or product features compared to each other. 
All are assumed to be equally important. This problem was tackled by the Active Buyer’s 
Guide System developed by Active Research, Inc. [Kurbel] The users are not only asked 
how desirable are certain product features for them but also how important is each product 
feature is when compared to others, and even how important are certain combinations of 
features compared to other combinations. 
Two further eMarkets are MAGMA [Tsvetovatyy] (Minnesota AGent Marketplace 
Architecture) and MAGNET [Collins] (Multi-Agent NEgotiation Testbed) developed by 
                                                 
1 http://www.priceline.com/ 
2 http://www.frictionless.com 
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University of Minnesota. MAGMA was an attempt to develop a prototype of an agent-based 
eMarket together with additional infrastructure including a banking system, 
communication, transport and storage system, plus administrative and policing systems. 
MAGMA includes trader agents, which are responsible for the buying and selling of goods 
and negotiating prices, and an advertising server for searching and retrieving adverts by 
categories. Negotiation is based on the Vickrey auction, where bids are submitted in written 
form with no knowledge of bids from others where the winner pays the second highest 
amount. In contrast to the MAGMA system, the MAGNET eMarket was intended to provide 
support for complex agent interactions such as automated contracting in supply-chain 
management. Evaluation of the bids received is based not on cost but also on time 
constraints and risk, providing a very simple multi-issue negotiation technique.  
MIAMI Marketplace (MIAMAP) [Esmahi] is an open virtual eMarket where agents process 
their marketing transactions, providing a generalised mediation model that supports a 
variety of transactions types, from simple buying and selling to complex multiagent contract 
negotiations. The negotiation strategy presented from this work takes advantage of the 
services located within the market to construct beneficial contracts. In its findings Esmahi, 
states that the introduction of an explicit mediator can help resolve conflicts and add value 
to multiagent contracting. These eMarkets and the differences between them are compared 
according to method outlined in [Kurbel] the results of which are shown in Table 4. 
Two further notable eMarkets specifically within the domain of telecommunications are the 
Digital MarketPlace (DMP) [Irvine] and the Telecommunication Service Exchange (TSE) 
[Griffin]. These eMarkets have been proposed to assist mobile users in being able to exert 
their bargaining power. This problem has emerged due to the fact that at present, mobile 
users are typically tied to their service provider via a long term contract lasting usually 12 
months or more. Within this time mobile users cannot switch from one service provider to 
another to avail of special offers and services that the alternative service provider may be 
capable of offering. This causes an inefficiency of competition in telecommunications from 
the mobile user’s perspective. However, allowing consumers to purchase services on a per 
request basis, while at the same time maintaining their contract with their chosen service 
providers however would provide more competition within the sector, and will force 
service providers to better serve the interests of users. 
 
 
Neg. 
Model 
Type of 
Neg. 
Issues 
Type of 
consumers 
constraints 
Type of 
merchants 
constraints 
BargainFinder A 
Search and 
comparison
Price Crisp Crisp 
Frictionless A 
Search and 
comparison
Price, product features, 
merchants services 
Fuzzy Crisp 
Active Buyers 
Guide System 
A 
Search and 
comparison
Price, product features Fuzzy Crisp 
MAGMA A Auction Price Fuzzy Fuzzy 
MAGNET A Auction Price, time, constraints, risk Fuzzy Fuzzy 
MIAMAP A Mediator Cost, price, risk Fuzzy Fuzzy 
 
Table 4. Comparison of eMarkets 
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The DMP presents one such solution to this problem, where mobile users can purchase calls 
on a per call basis. Internally, the DMP adopts an eMarket where Buyers, service providers 
and network operators are represented by their respective agents such as: User Agents (UA); 
Service Provider Agents (SPA); and Network Operator Agents (NOA). The UA are 
responsible for acquiring the mobile user’s preferences over attributes such price and QoS. 
Upon receipt of this request the UAs initiate an auction with the SPAs using a variant of 
First-Price Sealed-Bid (FPSB), where the buyer selects the bidder which maximises its 
objective function, while meeting its valuation. Although the system allows the User Agent 
(UA) to specify their requirements from a multi-attribute perspective, when the Service 
Provider Agent (SPA) receives the request it does not formulate a bid based on these 
attributes. Instead it responds with a single attribute, price when is then used by the UA 
along with the SPA performance rating (or commitment) to determine the winner of the 
auction round. This limitation inherently lies in the auction protocol chosen, First Price 
Sealed Bid, where it prevents the user from correctly evaluating, what it wanted in the 
original request to what it actually received in the call in terms of these attributes. It also 
prevents the UA in performing a proper comparison between the various service providers.  
The DMP is classified according to [Guttman] scheme below in Table 5. 
 
Criterion Possible Values 
Type of e-marketplace B2B B2C C2C 
Type of negotiation model 1:n (A) M:1 (B) n:m (C) 
Negotiation Issues One issue (price) Many Issues (partially) 
Type of consumers constraints Crisp Fuzzy 
Type of merchants constraints  Crisp Fuzzy 
Table 5. The Digital Marketplace (DMP) morphologic box classification 
The TSE on the other hand supports both B2C and B2B transaction allowing mobile users to 
purchase services on a per request basis and also allows the dynamic formation of Virtual 
Organisations in the B2B to create composite services using a Service Oriented Architectural 
(SOA) approach to service provisioning. While the internal architecture is similar to the 
DMP with the existence of Buyer User Agents (BUA), SPA and NOA, the TSE also has two 
notable additional agents, those being the Trusted Intermediary Agent (TIA) and the Better 
Business Bureau Agent (BBBA). The TIA essentially acts as the auctioneer in the 
eMarketplace and is responsible for acting on behalf of the buyer in the market. The BBBA is 
a similar to the Better Bureau Agent employed in Kasbah [Chavez], where post purchase 
feedback and consumer satisfaction is monitored to provide a rating of the service provider 
in the eMarketplace. The negotiation model employed in the TSE is similar to that of 
MAGNET [Collins] using call for proposals, propose and accept/reject message sequence.  
However, the TSE allows the BUAs to specify their requests in terms of multiple attributes 
as well as the relative importance of each attribute in terms of each other using the multi-
attribute auction protocol. The various SPA bids are then returned to the BUA and the 
winner is determined using a scoring function. A unique and novel feature of the TSE is that 
it is an exchange market infrastructure, as advocated by Collins et al, facilitating two 
separate but co-related markets, the B2B and the B2C. Table 6, further describes the TSE 
under the classification scheme discussed in [Guttman].  
Online auctions are doubtless the largest class of Internet-based eMarketplaces. There are 
literally thousands of auctions both in the B2B, B2C and C2C areas. Bean and Segev (1998) 
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examined 100 online auctions and analyzed their characteristics. Examples of these 
marketplaces include eBay and Amazon, which both use a variant of the English auction to 
sell its goods over the Internet. To sell something on eBay, one has to provide a description 
of the item together with some constraints including payment method, where to ship, who 
will pay for the shipment, minimum bid and reserve price. In fact by providing this 
information the seller initializes an agent to negotiate about one issue – price. On the bidder 
side, one can employ a “phantom” bidding service that utilizes the common bidding 
strategy of ‘sniping’. Such examples include eSnipe and Phantom Bidder. The Fishmarket 
[Napoli] electronic auction house is another example of an eMarketplace that uses the age-
old institution of a fish market using the Dutch bidding protocol. 
 
Criterion Possible Values 
Type of e-marketplace B2B B2C C2C 
Type of negotiation model 1:n (A) M:1 (B) n:m (C) 
Negotiation Issues One issue (price) Many Issues 
Type of consumers constraints Crisp Fuzzy 
Type of merchants constraints  Crisp Fuzzy 
Table 6. The TSE characteristics for Negotiation Model A 
5. Agents and eMarkets 
Woolridge et al defined an agent as a “computer system, situated in some environment that 
is capable of flexible autonomous actions in order to meet its design objectives”. Agents over 
the past number of decades have been applied to a wide range of applications, not least in 
the area of automated negotiation and auctions. In recent years initiatives such as the 
Trading Agent Competition (TAC) have attempted to drive research forward to enable 
scientists to evaluate programmed trading techniques in a market scenario by competing 
with agents from other design groups [Petric]. The following section will outline where 
agent technology has made the most impact with a particular emphasis on the topic of this 
chapter, eMarkets and auctions. 
Within the area of Grid computing – the agent and grid communities are both trying to 
address the problem of “coordinated problem solving in dynamic, multi-institutional (Virtual) 
Organizations”. Within this objective the Grid community has historically focused on what 
Foster et al, refers to as the “brawn” i.e. an interoperable infrastructure for secure and 
reliable resource sharing within dynamic and geographically distributed Virtual 
Organization (VO), while the agent community has focused on the “brains” i.e. on the 
development of concepts, methodologies, and algorithms for autonomous problem solvers. 
According to Foster et al, integrating the ‘brawns’ of the grid, with the ‘brains’ of the agent 
could result in “a framework for constructing large scale, agile distributed systems that are 
qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the best practice today”.  
Because of the horizontal nature of agent technology, it is also envisioned according to Luck 
et al, that the successful adoption of agent technology with Web services will have a 
profound, long term impact both on the competitiveness and viability of IT industries and 
also on the way in which future systems will be conceptualized and implemented. With 
Web services, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has described agents as the “running 
programs that drive Web services – both to implement them and to access them as computational 
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resources that act on behalf of a person or organisation”. In the previously discussed 
Telecommunication Service Exchange (TSE), the implementation of the B2B market within 
the exchange focused on dynamic Web service composition, using automated negotiation 
techniques and multi-attribute auctions to decide which atomic service element best suits a 
service provider’s non-functional Quality of Service (QoS) requirements [Griffin].  
A key aspect within eMarkets is the eCommerce and negotiation activities of such markets. 
Within these, agents are used to fully realise the economic benefits of its existence, where 
according to He et al “Electronic Commerce is the most important allocation for Agent 
technologies, because it is reality-based and constitutes a massive market”. As a result the adoption 
of agent technology is a central element to the operations within any eMarket, where these 
agents negotiate of behalf of their owners. Automating these activities through the use of 
agents can save time, and in complex settings it has been shown by research by Das et al, 
that when agents and humans participate simultaneously in a realistic auction, the software 
agents consistently produce greater gains compared to their human counterparts. The 
application of agents in B2B eCommerce transactions has been viewed as particularly 
promising, since manual bidding would obviously not be practical, and negotiations in such 
eMarkets would have to be preformed by the selling and buying agents with sophisticated 
agent strategies. In B2C and C2C eMarkets agent technology is not foreseen to make as big 
an impact. The reason for this is that human customers like the bidding frenzy and they 
enjoy placing the bids and the entertainment value of an online auction is an important 
component of the experience [Beam, 1997]. The disadvantage of such frenzied actions is that 
the participants sometimes can fall victim to a phenomenon known as the “winners curse”.  
As previously stated these eCommerce transactions take place within an eMarket, where 
Section 5 provided an in-depth overview of existing implementations. In order for software 
agents to represent their human owners within the eMarket they need to communicate with 
each other. Such communication is normally represented through some kind of Agent 
Communication Language (ACL) and is used to share information and knowledge among 
agents in distributed computing environments, but also request the performance of a task. 
The main objective of ACL is to model a suitable framework that allows heterogeneous 
agents to interact and to communicate with meaningful statements that convey information 
about their environment or knowledge. 
The most recent evolution of ACLs is the draft standard proposed by the Foundation for 
Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA). This foundation is a non-profit association whose 
objective consists of promoting the success of emerging agent-based technology and was 
officially accepted by the IEEE at its eleventh standards committee meeting in June 2005. It 
operates through an open international collaboration of companies and universities who are 
active members in the field. FIPA assigns tasks (ontologies, semantics, architectures, 
gateways and compliance) to technical committees, each of which has primary responsibility 
for producing, maintaining and updating the specifications applicable to its tasks. FIPAs 
Agent Communication Language (FIPA-ACL) is based on speech act theory and messages 
are considered to be communicative acts, whose objective is to perform some action by 
virtue of being sent. FIPA-ACL also defines a set of interaction protocols, as detailed in 
Table 7 which deal with pre-agreed message exchange protocols for ACL messages. What is 
clear from the Table 7 is the incorporation of existing standard auction protocols into FIPA 
interaction protocols, demonstrating a clear importance of the use of agent technology with 
auction protocols.   
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FIPA 
Identifier  
Title of 
Interaction 
Protocol 
Function 
SC00026 Request  Allows one agent to request another to perform some 
action 
SC00027 Query  Allows one agent to request to perform some kind of 
action on another agent 
SC00028 Request When  Allows an agent to request that the receiver perform some 
action at the time a given precondition becomes true 
SC00029 Contract Net  One agent takes the role of manager and wishes to have 
some task preformed by one or more other agents and 
further wishes to optimize a function that characterizes 
the task. For a given task, any number of the participants 
may respond with a Proposal message 
SC00031 English 
Auction  
Auctioneer calls are expressed in Call for Proposals (cfp) 
acts, and are multicast to participants in the English 
auction. Participants propose bids in a propose act, and 
the auctioneer notifies winner in an accept-proposal act 
SC00032 Dutch Auction  Models the Dutch auction by using a series of acts such as 
inform-start-of-auction, cfp, propose, accept and reject 
proposal 
SC00033 Brokering  Is designed to support brokerage interactions in mediated 
systems and in multi-agent systems. A broker is an agent 
that offers a set of communication facilitation services to 
other agents using some knowledge about the 
requirements and capabilities of those agents 
SC00034 Recruiting  Is designed to support recruiting interactions in mediated 
and multi-agent systems, where a recruiter is another type 
of broker agent 
SC00035 Subscribe  Allows an agent to request a receiving agent to perform 
an action on subscription and subsequently when the 
referenced object changes 
SC00036 Propose  Allows an agent to propose to receiving agents that the 
initiator will do the actions described in the propose 
communicative act when the receiving agent accepts the 
proposal 
Table 7. FIPA ACL Interaction Protocol 
6. Conclusion 
In summary, it is important to note that the Internet does not really change much of the 
fundamental characteristics of the general negotiation process. However the expansion and 
integration of the Internet into our everyday lives has resulted in work being conducted to 
support the ever increasing demand of mostly B2B eCommerce transactions, where 
according to [cf. Bichler] “Internet based electronic marketplaces leverage information technology 
to match buyers and sellers with increased effectiveness and lower transactions costs, leading to more 
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efficient “friction-free” markets”. The complexity to support such eMarkets lies in the fact that 
the parties involved in these transactions are located across geographically distributed 
locations with complex requirements that will form part of their trade agreements. As a 
result in the future, market design will play an ever more important role in the automated 
negotiation process, as sellers and service providers will want to ensure that the outcome is 
efficient giving them the highest utility possible. Of course, auctions play a crucial element 
in automated negotiation and while a huge variety of auctions exist, it is important to note 
that some of the more interesting auction types such as multi-attribute auctions consider 
multiple considerations in the negotiation. As a result, multi-attribute auctions will play a 
vital element in B2B eCommerce in the future. To automate such negotiations in B2B 
eMarkers, it is envisioned that agents will negotiate on behalf of their human owners, with 
implemented strategies calculated using Game theory to ensure the highest utility from the 
process. 
7. References 
R. Bapna, Goes, P., and Gupta, A., Insights and analysis of on-line auctions, 
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 44 pgs. 43-90 
Beam, C., and  Segev, A., Automated Negotiations: A Survey of the State of the Art, CMIT 
Working Paper 97-WP-1022, May 1997 
Beam, C., and  Segev, A., Auctions on the Internet: A field study, Working Paper 98-WP-
1032  
Bichler, M., The future of eMarkets, Multidimensional Market Mechanism, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001 
Binmore, K., Vulkan, N.,  Applying game theory to automated negotiation, Netnomics, Vol 
(1):1, pgs. 1-9, 1999 
K. Binmore, K.,  Klemperer, P., The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom 
Licenses, Economic Journal, 2002  
Branco, F., The design of multidimensional auctions, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 
(1), pg.63-81, 1997  
Carter, C., Kaufmann, L., Beall, S., Carter, P., Hendrick, T. and Petersen, K., Reverse 
Auctions - Grounded Theory from the Buyer and Supplier Perspective, 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Vol: 40(3), 
2004 
Chavez, A. and Maes, P., Kasbah: An Agent Marketplace for buying and selling goods, First 
International Conference on the Practical Application of Intelligent Agents and 
Multi-Agent Technology (PAAM'96)  
Che, K. Y., Design Competition through multidimensional auctions, RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 24 (4),1993 
Collins, J., Jamison, S., Mobasher, B. and Gini, M., A Market Architecture for Multi-Agent 
Contracting, Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Autonomous 
Agents, 1998  
Collins, J., Tsvetovatyy, M., Gini, M. and Mobasher, B., MAGNET: A Multi-Agent 
Contracting System for Plan Execution, in Proc. of the Workshop on Artificial 
Intelligence and Manufacturing, New Mexico, August 1998  
www.intechopen.com
 Multiagent Systems 
 
394 
Das, R., Hanson, J.,  Kephart, J.O. and Tesauro, G., Agent-Human Interactions in the 
Continuous Double Auction, in Proc. International Joint Conference of Artificial 
Intelligence, Seattle, USA, August 2001  
Dasgupta, S., and Spulber, D.F., Managing procurement auctions, Information Economics 
and Policy, Vol 4, pg.5-29, 1989  
David, E., Azoulay-Schwartz, R. and Kraus, S., Protocols and Strategies for Automated 
Multi-Attribute  Auctions, In Proc. First Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents 
and Multiagent Systems, Bologna, Italy, 2002  
Doorenbos,  R.B., Etzioni, O. and Weld, D.S., A Scalable Comparison-Shopping Agent for 
the World-Wide Web in Proc. of the First International Conference on Autonomous 
Agents, California, USA, Feb5-8, 1997 
Easley, D. and Ledyard, J., Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral 
auctions, In Friedman, D. & Rust, J., eds., The Double Auction Market: Institutions, 
Theories and Evidence, pgs. 3-25, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1993 
Esmahi, L., Bernard, J-C. and Dini,  P., MIAMAP: A Virtual Market Place for Intelligent 
Agents, in Proc. of the 33rd International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, 
2000 
Feldman, S., Electronic Marketplaces, in IEEE Internet Computing, Vol 4(4), pg. 93-95, Aug 
2000 
 Foster,  I., Jennings, N.R. and Kesselman, C., Brain Meets Brawn: Why Grid and Agents 
Need Each Other, in Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent 
Systems, New York, USA, 2004 
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, http://www.fipa.org 
FIPA ACL Message Structure Specification, XC00061D, http://www.fipa.org/ 
specs/fipa00061/XC00061D.pdf 
Gibbons, R.,  A Primer in Game Theory, London, Prentice Hall, 1992 
 Gode, D. and  Sunder, S., Lower bounds for efficiency of surplus extraction in double 
auctions, In Friedman, D. & Rust, J., eds., The Double Auction Market: Institutions, 
Theories and Evidence, pgs. 199-219, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1993 
Griffin, D. and Pesch, D., Mobile Communications Systems – The Telecommunication 
Service Exchange, IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, 
Vol:3(2), Second Quarter 2006 
Guttman,  R.H., Moukas, A.G. and Maes, P., Agent-mediated Electronic Commerce: A 
Survey, The Knowledge Engineering Review, Vol 13 (2), pg. 147-159, 1998 
He, M., Jennings, N.R. and Leung, H-F., On Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, IEEE 
Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 15(4), pg. 985-1003, 2003 
He, M., Leung, H-F., and Jennings, N.R., A fuzzy logic based bidding strategy for 
autonomous agents in continuous double auctions, IEEE Transactions on 
Knowledge and Data Engineering, Vol: 15(6), 2003 
Hurwicz, L., The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation, the American Economic 
Review, Vol. 63 (2), Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of 
the American Economic Association, 1973 
Irvine, J., Adam Smith Goes Mobile: Managing Serviced Beyond  3G with the Digital 
Marketplace, Invited Paper to European Wireless 2002, Florence, Italy, February 
2002 
www.intechopen.com
Auctions and Electronic Markets 
 
395 
Jackson, M.O., Mechanism Theory, In The Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems. EOLSS 
Publishers, 2000 
Jenman, N.,  Don’t sign anything, Auctions-Trickery and Deception on a Massive Scale, 
Simon & Schuster, Australia,  2002  
Kagel, J.H., Auctions: A survey of experimental research, In Kagel, J.H., Roth, A.E., (eds.), 
The handbook of experimental economics (pp.501-586), New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press 
Kagel, J.H., A. E. Roth, Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey, 1995 
Kelly, F., and Steinberg, R., A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal 
science, Management Science, Vol: 46(4), 2000 
Kim, J.B. and A. Segev, A Web Services-enabled marketplace architecture for negotiation 
process management, Decision Support Systems, Volume 40, Issue 1, July 
2005, Pages 71-87 
Klemperer, P., Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol 
13(3), July 1999 
Kraus, S., Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments, Special issue on 
economic principles of multi-agent systems in Artificial Intelligence, Vol (94):1-2, 
pgs. 79-97, 1997 
Krulwich, B., The BargainFinder agent: Comparison price shopping on the Internet, In. 
Williams, J., ed., Bots and Other Internet Beasties. SAMS.NET, 1996 
Kurbel, K. and Loutchko, L., Towards Multi-Agent Electronic Marketplaces: What is There 
and What is Missing?, The Knowledge Engineering Review, Vol 18(1), pg. 33-46, 
2003 
J-J Laffont, and Tirole, J., A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, 
Cambridge:MA, The MIT Press 
Linhart, P.B., Radner, R. and Satterthwaite, M.A., (eds.), Bargaining with Incomplete 
Information, San. Diego, Academic Press, 1992 
Luck, M., McBurney, P. and Priest,C., A Manifesto for Agent Technology: Towards Next 
Generation Computing, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Vol.  9(3), 
pg. 203-252, 2004 
McAfee, R.P and McMillian, J., Auctions and Bidding, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
25 (2), 1987 
Milgrom, P.R. and Weber, R.J., A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 
Econometrica, 50, pgs.1089-1122 
Di Napoli, C., Sierra, Giordano, M., Norlega, P. and Furnari, M.M., A PVM implementation 
of the Fishmarket Multiagent System, in Proc.  Collaboration in Intelligent Systems 
Technologies, Mexico,1996 
Nash, J.F., The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 18 (1950), pgs. 155-162 
von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O., The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
Princeton University Press, 1994 
Osborne, J-J. and Rubinstein, A., A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, London, 1994 
Park, S., Durfee, E and Birmingham, W., An Adaptive agent bidding strategy based on 
stochastic modelling, in Proc. of the third international conference on Autonomous 
Agents, the Netherlands, 1999 
www.intechopen.com
 Multiagent Systems 
 
396 
Pepys, S., Diary, September 3rd 1662, Retrieved from: http://www.pepys.info/1662 
/1662sep.html, The High Cost of Collusion, Editorial, New York Times, 12/8/01, p. 
A22. 
Petric, A., Podobnik, V., Grguric A. and Zemljic, M.,  Designing an effective e-market: an 
overview of the CAT agent. Proceedings of the International Trading Agent Design 
and Analysis Workshop (TADA 2008).  Chicago, IL, USA, July 2008 
Pruitt, D., Negotiation Behaviour, Academic Press, 1981 
Raiffa, H., The art and science of negotiation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 
Rawlinson, G. and Translater, G., The History of Herodotus, Retrieved from, 
http://classics.mit.edu  
Rothkopf, M.H. and Harstad, R.M., Modelling competitive bidding: A critical essay, 
Management Science Vol 40(3), pgs. 364-384 
Rubinstein, A., Perfect Equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 50 (1), pgs. 97-109, 
1982 
Shaw, A., Electronic commerce: state of art. In Shaw M, Blanning R, Strader T, Whinston A 
(eds). Handbook on electronic commerce. Springer, Berlin 
Smith, A., ed.,  Campbell, R.H., ed., Skinner, A.S., Wealth of Nations, An inquiry into the 
nature and causes of the wealth of nations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976 
De Smet, Y., Butterfly auctions: clustering the bidding space, In Proc. of 6th International 
Conference on Electronic Commerce Research, Dallas, USA, 2003 
Smeltzer, L.R. and Carr, A.S., Electronic reverse auctions: Promises, risks and conditions for 
success, Industrial Marketing Management, Vol: 32(6), 2003 
Tesauro, G. and Bredin, J., Strategic sequential bidding in auctions using dynamic 
programming, in Proc. in the first international joint conference on Autonomous 
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Italy, 2002 
Thiel, S.E., Multidimensional auctions, Economic Letters, vol. 28, pg. 37-40, 1988 
Tsvetovatyy, M., Gini, M., Mobasher, B. and Wieckowski, Z., MAGMA: An Agent-Based 
Virtual Market for Electronic Commerce, Journal of Applied Artificial Intelligence 
Vol. 11 (6), pg. 501 - 523, September 1997 
Varian, H.R., Economic Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents, in Proc. of the First 
Usenix Conference on Electronic Commerce, New York, July 1995 
Vickrey, W., Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of 
Finance, 16(1), pp. 44-61, March 1961 
Woolridge, M. and Jennings, N.R., Intelligent Agents: Theory and Practice, Knowledge 
Engineering Review, 10(2) pg. 115-152, 1995  
Wurman, P.R., Dynamic Pricing in the virtual marketplace, IEEE Internet Computing, Vol: 
5(2) pgs. 36-42, 2001 
Wurman, P., Walsh, W. And Wellman, M., Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: 
Theory and implementation, Decision Support Systems, Vol 24(1), pgs 17-27, 1998 
Wurman, P.R., Wellman, M. and Walsh, W., The Michigan Internet Actionbot: a 
configurable auction server for human and server agents, in Proc of the 2nd 
International conference on Autonomous Agents, pgs. 301-308, Minnepolis, USA, 
1998 
 
www.intechopen.com
Multiagent Systems
Edited by Salman Ahmed and Mohd Noh Karsiti
ISBN 978-3-902613-51-6
Hard cover, 426 pages
Publisher I-Tech Education and Publishing
Published online 01, January, 2009
Published in print edition January, 2009
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
Multi agent systems involve a team of agents working together socially to accomplish a task. An agent can be
social in many ways. One is when an agent helps others in solving complex problems. The field of multi agent
systems investigates the process underlying distributed problem solving and designs some protocols and
mechanisms involved in this process. This book presents an overview of some of the research issues in the
field of multi agents. It is a presentation of a combination of different research issues which are pursued by
researchers in the domain of multi agent systems as they are one of the best ways to understand and model
human societies and behaviours. In fact, such systems are the systems of the future.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Donna Griffin and Dirk Pesch (2009). Auctions and Electronic Markets, Multiagent Systems, Salman Ahmed
and Mohd Noh Karsiti (Ed.), ISBN: 978-3-902613-51-6, InTech, Available from:
http://www.intechopen.com/books/multiagent_systems/auctions_and_electronic_markets
© 2009 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike-3.0 License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited and
derivative works building on this content are distributed under the same
license.
